Mercury’s Toxic Process: How Bad Science and Bad Decisions Caused a Public Health Crisis by Mercurio, Cameryn
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review
Volume 44 | Issue 1 Article 4
4-6-2017
Mercury’s Toxic Process: How Bad Science and
Bad Decisions Caused a Public Health Crisis
Cameryn Mercurio
Boston College Law School, cameryn.mercurio@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Food and Drug Law Commons, Health Law and
Policy Commons, and the Law and Society Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more
information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cameryn Mercurio, Mercury’s Toxic Process: How Bad Science and Bad Decisions Caused a Public Health Crisis, 44 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev.
83 (2017),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/vol44/iss1/4
  
83 
MERCURY’S TOXIC PROCESS: HOW BAD 
SCIENCE AND BAD DECISIONS CAUSED  
A PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS 
CAMERYN MERCURIO* 
Abstract: Since 1998, ethylmercury, a vaccine preservative, has often been con-
fused with methylmercury, a dangerous neurotoxin, by the government and pub-
lic. This confusion has led to a decrease in vaccination rates and an increase in 
the spread of preventable disease. Despite significant efforts to educate the public 
on the inaccuracy of studies linking ethylmercury to autism, the public health 
agencies have been unsuccessful in demonstrating to the public that the substance 
is safe. This Note analyzes the actions taken by the public health agencies re-
sponding to public concerns about ethylmercury’s use in vaccines and recom-
mends that the agencies undertake a comprehensive study of ethylmercury to de-
termine its safety and resolve the growing public health crisis. 
INTRODUCTION 
Only a few decades ago, mercury was considered safe.1 It was commonly 
used in many household products and industrial facilities with almost no regu-
lation because there was little awareness of the dangers of mercury.2 In the 
modern era the world’s view of this once seemingly safe material has shifted 
dramatically, causing fear and misunderstanding of this substance.3 
The saga began in the 1960s, when it was discovered that industrial emis-
sions of one type of mercury—methylmercury—contaminated the surrounding 
                                                                                                                           
 * Executive Articles Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2016–
2017. 
 1 Gary Bigham et al., Mercury—A Tale of Two Toxins, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Spring 2005, 
at 26, 26 (“the toxicological significance of methylmercury and its behavior in the environment were 
not discovered until the twentieth century”). 
 2 Id. at 29 (noting that mercury regulation did not begin in the United States until 1941, with the 
majority of regulation beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, following the discovery of the negative 
health effects of environmental mercury). 
 3 See Leila Barraza et al., Denialism and Its Adverse Effect on Public Health, JURIMETRICS J. L. 
SCI & TECH., Spring 2013, at 307, 308 (discussing the public health risks from public misperception 
of ethylmercury in vaccines); Bigham et al., supra note 1, at 29 (identifying the difficulties in regulat-
ing methylmercury); Mary Ann Chirba-Martin & Carolyn M. Welshhans, An Uncertain Risk and an 
Uncertain Future: Assessing the Legal Implications of Mercury Amalgam Fillings, HEALTH MATRIX 
J. L.-MED., Summer 2004, at  293, 293–94 (discussing the controversy behind the use of mercury 
amalgam dental fillings); Lauren L. Haertlein, Immunizing Against Bad Science: The Vaccine Court 
and the Autism Test Cases, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2012, at 211, 230 (discussing the public 
health risk from the misinformation about ethylmercury in vaccines). 
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air, water, and land of a chemical company in Minimata, Japan, and caused 
mercury poisoning in nearby residents.4 Methylmercury is a neurotoxin that 
causes severe neurological damage to humans.5 The Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) quickly took charge to regulate the substance in the United 
States and, where contamination existed, initiated clean up efforts to prevent 
further harm to humans.6 In the ensuing decades, EPA made significant strides 
in the regulation of methylmercury; however, methylmercury continues to con-
taminate large bodies of water and the food supply.7 
The negative effects of methylmercury quickly became publicly accepted, 
creating a general awareness of this environmental danger.8 The fear made it 
easy for Americans to accept industry regulation and even dietary recommen-
dations to reduce the consumption of fish that were likely to be contaminated 
by methylmercury.9 
Ethylmercury is another mercurial substance, but it does not pose the 
same health risks as methylmercury.10 Used as a key ingredient in the vaccine 
preservative thimerosal, ethylmercury existed for decades with little public 
awareness.11 After a scientifically flawed study linked Autism Spectrum Dis-
                                                                                                                           
 4 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-HQ-OPPT-2005-0013, EPA’S ROADMAP FOR MERCURY 3 (July 
2006) [hereinafter EPA MERCURY REPORT]; Bigham et al., supra note 1, at 29. Bigham describes the 
methylmercury contamination caused by a by-product of chemical production in Minimata, Japan and 
the neurotoxic symptoms presenting in residents. 
 5 EPA MERCURY REPORT, supra note 4, at 4, 7; Joëlle Anne Moreno, Toxic Torts, Autism, and 
Bad Science: Why the Courts May Be Our Best Defense Against Scientific Relativism, 40 NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 409, 410 (2006); Thimerosal in Vaccines, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 20, 2015), 
http://www.fda.gov/biologicsbloodvaccines/safetyavailability/vaccinesafety/ucm096228.htm#ref 
[https://perma.cc/LJ9S-95EE]. Methylmercury is found in nature and is a common output of many 
industrial facilities and coal-fired power plants. EPA MERCURY REPORT, supra note 4, at 4, 7. 
 6 Bigham et al., supra note 1, at 29–31 (outlining the history of methylmercury regulation by 
EPA). 
 7 EPA MERCURY REPORT, supra note 4, at 3; Bigham et al., supra note 1, at 30; Thomas Sinks et 
al., The Science and the Law of Toxics, J. L. MED. & ETHICS, Winter 2007 Supp., at 63, 64; Thimero-
sal in Vaccines, supra note 5. 
 8 See Bigham et al., supra note 1, at 29 (crediting photos in Life magazine as the original source 
of the public’s awareness of the ethylmercury contamination in Minimata, Japan). 
 9 Id., at 27–28, 30–31 (describing various regulated products and industries); Moreno, supra note 
5, at 410 (describing the broad acceptance of mercury’s danger); see Mark Holden, FDA-EPA Public 
Health Guidance on Fish Consumption: A Case Study on Informal Interagency Cooperation in 
“Shared Regulatory Space,” 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 101, 119 (2015) (describing the initial broad au-
thority under which the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) was able to regulate). 
 10 Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 321 (differentiating the toxicity of methylmercury from the tox-
icity of ethylmercury); Moreno, supra note 5, at 412–13 (differentiating the chemical structures of 
ethylmercury and methylmercury and explaining that these differences lead to different health out-
comes in humans). 
 11 See Moreno, supra note 5, at 410–11 (describing the early public reactions when ethylmercu-
ry’s use became widely known in the early 2000s); Paul A. Offit, Thimerosal and Vaccines—A Cau-
tionary Tale, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1278, 1278 (2007) (outlining the history of ethylmercury as a 
preservative in vaccines since the 1930s); Thimerosal in Vaccines, supra note 5 (reviewing the initial 
introduction and purpose of thimerosal in vaccines). 
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order (autism or “ASD”) to the use of thimerosal in the Measles, Mumps, and 
Rubella (“MMR”) combined vaccine, parents across the United States and 
many other countries suddenly became aware of a covert source of mercury in 
their lives.12 The public’s acceptance of methylmercury as a threat and limited 
public knowledge of ethylmercury created confusion and controversy that led 
to a temporary shift to regulate—then shift back to deregulate—
ethylmercury.13 Shocked parents, who perceived the ethylmercury found in 
thimerosal to be the same as methylmercury, feared that they had unwittingly 
consented to injecting a neurotoxin into their infants.14 
The government’s experts at the Food and Drug Administration  (FDA) 
and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), among others (col-
lectively “Public Health Service,” “the PHS agencies,” or “the agencies”), 
quickly instituted a ban on the use of thimerosal in vaccines.15 The agencies 
used EPA’s regulatory standards for the environmental neurotoxin methylmer-
cury to justify the dramatic prohibition of ethylmercury.16 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See Moreno, supra note 5, at 411 (sharing a grandparent’s story of surprise when grandson 
began showing symptoms of Autism Spectrum Disorder, (autism or “ASD”) shortly after vaccina-
tions). See generally AJ Wakefield et al., RETRACTED: Ileal-Lymphoid-Nodular Hyperplasia, Non-
Specific Colitis, and Pervasive Developmental Disorder in Children, 351 THE LANCET 637 (1998) 
(now-retracted study linking the Measles Mumps and Rubella (“MMR”) vaccine to symptoms of 
autism). 
 13 See Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 321 (identifying pubic awareness of thimerosal, a preserva-
tive containing ethylmercury, as a primary instigator of vaccination fears); Moreno, supra note 5, at 
410–11 (sharing anecdotes of parent and grandparent reactions to the discovery that ethylmercury was 
present in vaccines); Offit, supra note 11, at 1278 (describing the initial ethylmercury calculations by 
the FDA and the subsequent public awareness). 
 14 Statement on Thimerosal, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (July 2006), http://www.who.int/vaccine_
safety/committee/topics/thiomersal/statement_jul2006/en/ [https://perma.cc/294M-GEAY] [hereinaf-
ter WHO Thimerosal Statement] (identifying the source of vaccine fear in the United States as a con-
fusion between ethylmercury and methylmercury); see Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 318 (describing 
the impact of the internet in helping “like-minded individuals” find support while ignoring scientific 
dissent); Moreno, supra note 5, at 410 (“I was outraged that I was not told that the most powerful 
neurotoxin was going to be injected into my new born [sic] child.”). 
 15 Safety, Effectiveness, and Availability of Influenza and Other Vaccines: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on  Lab., Health & Hum. Servs., Educ., & Related Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appropria-
tions, 108th Cong. (Oct. 4, 2004) (statement of William Egan, Ph.D., Acting Director, Office of Vac-
cines Research & Review, Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research), FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 
(Oct. 5, 2004), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm113261.htm [https://perma.cc/QK9W-
S6MS] [hereinafter Vaccine Testimony] (describing the ban as precautionary); Offit, supra note 11, at 
1278 (outlining the events leading to the prohibition); Thimerosal in Vaccines, supra note 5 (review-
ing FDA actions leading to the ban); Timeline: Thimerosal in Vaccines (1999–2010), CTRS. FOR DIS-
EASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug. 28, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/concerns/
thimerosal/timeline.html [https://perma.cc/AD8U-637A] (providing the timeline of agency action 
leading to the ban as well as subsequent research milestones). 
 16 See Vaccine Testimony, supra note 15; Offit, supra note 11, at 1278. Acting Director of the 
Office of Vaccines Research and Review, William Egan, Ph.D., identified EPA’s methylmercury 
standard as an original reference standard for the review of thimerosal. Vaccine Testimony, supra note 
15. 
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Shortly after these prohibitions were put into place, scientists around the 
world disproved the MMR combined vaccine study that had incited this panic 
and the PHS agencies lifted the ban on thimerosal.17 Once again, ethylmercury 
was classified as a safe substance.18 Because the agencies based this classifica-
tion only on studies absolving thimerosal of any autism risk, there was no 
comprehensive safety assessment that could fully allay public fears.19 Mixed 
messages, including a federal recommendation to develop thimerosal-free vac-
cines and state-level prohibitions on the use of thimerosal, left some parents 
fearful of vaccines and generally distrusting of the agencies’ recommenda-
tions.20 This widespread fear and skepticism led to serious public health con-
sequences as the rate of vaccinated infants decreased.21 
Critics have since questioned the agencies’ precautionary ban in light of 
the virulent public reaction and negative long-term effects on public health.22 
Under these circumstances, the agencies failed to utilize the relevant available 
information and therefore could not adequately judge and implement an ap-
propriate strategy.23 The agencies’ decision to reverse the prohibition of ethyl-
mercury was dangerous because it ignored the public health risk the ban had 
already created.24 Absent additional research into the safety of ethylmercury 
outside the scope of ASD, the agencies are in the same position where they 
                                                                                                                           
 17 Vaccine Testimony, supra note 15; Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 317; Moreno, supra note 5, 
at 414; WHO Thimerosal Statement, supra note 14. 
 18 Vaccine Testimony, supra note 15; Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 317; Moreno, supra, note 5 
at 414; Timeline: Thimerosal in Vaccines (1999–2010), supra note 15; WHO Thimerosal Statement, 
supra note 14. Agency testimony indicates that the results of reviewing the autism-related research as 
demonstrating the causal link was only theoretical, a conclusion supported by WHO statements. Vac-
cine Testimony, supra note 15; WHO Thimerosal Statement, supra note 14. 
 19 See Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 319 (suggesting that additional investigation into the risks of 
thimerosal may be appropriate to combat concerns about vaccinations). 
 20 See id. at 317–18 (describing the evolution of the anti-vaccine movement); Moreno, supra note 
5, at 414–15 (highlighting two anti-vaccine leaders fueling this fear and distrust); Offit, supra note 11, 
at 1278–79 (discussing the growth of the anti-vaccine movement). 
 21 STATE OF THE WORLD’S VACCINE AND IMMUNIZATION 66 (World Health Org. et al. eds., 3d 
ed. 2009) (linking decreased infant vaccination rates to public awareness of the MMR vaccine study); 
Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 321–22 (discussing the impact of decreased vaccination rates concen-
trated in communities, including specific outbreaks caused by unvaccinated individuals); Offit, supra 
note 11, at 1279 (identifying a specific example of overreaction by medical institutions resulting in 
lower vaccination rates causing one fatality from preventable illness). 
 22 See Offit, supra note 11, at 1279 (suggesting that the use of the precautionary principle in this 
instance caused harm to public health). 
 23 See Moreno, supra note 5, at 415–16 (noting the prevalent conspiracy theories and highlighting 
the non-governmental actors seeking to fill this education role where the agencies failed); Offit, supra 
note 11, at 1278 (describing the limited data used to make the decision); Thimerosal in Vaccines, 
supra note 5 (identifying several reports and toxicity studies available at the time of the precautionary 
ban indicating that thimerosal was safe, even at doses significantly higher than the immunization 
schedule total). 
 24 See Offit, supra note 11, at 1279. 
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began—without a comprehensive scientific basis of ethylmercury’s safety.25 
The agencies must regulate ethylmercury because the environment of fear and 
distrust caused by the public misunderstanding is a negative health effect under 
their authority.26 
This Note argues that the PHS agencies failed, and continue to fail, to re-
spond to the public’s fear of the use of thimerosal in vaccines and recommends 
a comprehensive approach to resolving the public health crisis through re-
search, transparency, and a clear structure of agency accountability.27 Part I of 
this Note outlines the history of mercury regulation in the environmental and 
public health contexts and offers a review of the autism vaccine controversy.28 
Part II analyzes the reasonableness of the agency actions following the contro-
versy and discusses the negative impact these actions had on public health.29 
Finally, Part III recommends a methodology to resolve the current flaws in the 
Public Health Agencies’ process of ethylmercury and vaccine regulation and 
increase public trust and immunization rates.30 
I. THE HISTORY OF MERCURY REGULATION—FROM IGNORANCE TO FEAR 
The Food and Drug Administration and the Environmental Protection 
Agency regulate mercury-based substances.31 In spite of their broad regulatory 
power, agencies have historically been hesitant to assert the full breadth of 
their authority because of the lack of scientific data on the toxicity levels of all 
mercurial substances.32 Without clear data about the dangers posed to humans, 
the agencies generally categorize substances as safe and, therefore, do not reg-
ulate them.33 This presumption of safety allows mercury to remain common-
                                                                                                                           
 25 See Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 319. 
 26 See id. at 321–22; Moreno, supra note 5, at 415; Offit, supra note 11, at 1279. The risks of 
vaccine misinformation include international public health because manufacturers may remove pre-
servatives, which continue to be essential in developing countries, from all vaccines to satisfy demand 
in the American market. Moreno, supra note 5, at 415. 
 27 See infra notes 134–247 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 31–133 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 134–186 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 187–247 and accompanying text. 
 31 See Bigham et al., supra note 1, at 27–31. 
 32 See id. at 27 (noting that, historically, the United States has been slow to regulate, even com-
pared to other western countries); Sinks et al., supra note 7, at 64 (discussing conflicting studies on 
maximum safety levels for methylmercury exposure and the lack of data available on ethylmercury). 
 33 See Kimberly M. Baga, Taking a Bite Out of the Harmful Effects of Mercury in Dental Fillings: 
Advocating for National Legislation for Mercury Amalgams, 20 J. L. & HEALTH 169, 180 (2007) 
(describing the FDA’s decision not to regulate after finding that “the evidence is not persuasive that 
the potential for toxicity at the levels attributable to dental amalgams should be totally disregarded,” 
even though it admitted there was insufficient evidence to determine the amalgams are in fact safe); 
Elizabeth Fisher, Framing Risk Regulation: A Critical Reflection, 4 EUR. J. RISK REG. 125, 131–32 
(arguing that the linear risk assessment model often leads to “conventional assumptions” in the face of 
uncertainty); see also Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 
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place in household products, like thermometers, and as a preservative for medi-
cal products.34 
The public’s misunderstanding of the different types of mercury is best 
exemplified by the confusion and controversy surrounding methylmercury and 
ethylmercury—one a dangerous neurotoxin, the other a non-toxic preserva-
tive.35 Agencies broadly regulate methylmercury based on substantial evidence 
that it is harmful to human health, but have faced challenges in regulating 
ethylmercury due to lack of scientific knowledge.36 Recent attempts to regulate 
the use of ethylmercury in vaccines have faltered from inconsistent decision-
making, despite clear direction from past agency procedure, Congress, and the 
United States Supreme Court.37 
A. Methylmercury: A Dangerous Environmental Neurotoxin 
Methylmercury is a neurotoxin proven to cause significant damage to 
human health and has been linked to impaired neurological development in 
infants and fetuses.38 Methylmercury is most commonly found as a byproduct 
of industrial plant operations.39 For example, coal-fired power plants release 
this toxic substance into the surrounding air, water, and land.40 In order to inhibit 
this release, agencies have issued containment regulations that require power 
plants to reduce or eliminate the amount of methylmercury used and the amount 
emitted by the plant.41 EPA utilizes its regulatory powers primarily to monitor, 
decrease, clean, and ultimately prohibit emissions of methylmercury.42 EPA 
also works with the FDA to promulgate dietary recommendations for food 
products, such as fish, that are likely to have a high methylmercury content.43 
                                                                                                                           
125–29 (2000) (noting the preference to categorize tobacco products as safe before conclusive evi-
dence of a link to lung cancer and other diseases was demonstrated). 
 34 Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 321; Bigham et al., supra note 1, at 27. 
 35 See infra notes 76–111 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 58–111 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 76–133 and accompanying text. 
 38 EPA MERCURY REPORT, supra note 4, at 4, 7 (defining the sources of contamination and the 
neurotoxic effects of methylmercury on human health); Thimerosal in Vaccines, supra note 5 (de-
scribing the neurotoxic effects of methylmercury in fetuses). 
 39 EPA MERCURY REPORT, supra note 4, at 3. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 See Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012); Clean Air Act (Air Pollution 
Control Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012); EPA MERCURY REPORT, supra note 4, at 8–9. 
 43 Press Release, Food & Drug Admin, FDA and EPA Issue Draft Updated Advice for Fish Con-
sumption (June 10, 2014) (available on WestLaw, 2014 WL 2749498) [hereinafter Fish Advisory]; 
see infra notes 67–75 and accompanying text. 
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B. Regulatory Basics: Standards of Causation 
 Although government regulation of many mercurial substances is lim-
ited, agencies take a broad approach to methylmercury regulation based on 
concrete scientific evidence that proves this substance causes neurological 
damage.44 To regulate a substance, an agency must show that the substance 
actually causes harm under one of three standards of causation: (1) the neces-
sary and sufficient approach; (2) the public health approach; and (3) the risk 
assessment approach.45 EPA regulates methylmercury under the risk assess-
ment approach, with elements of the public health approach blended in.46 
The necessary and sufficient approach requires the substance subject to 
regulation be necessary to cause the negative health consequence and that ex-
posure to the substance be sufficient to trigger it.47 This strict standard requires 
direct scientific evidence that the negative health effect never occurs in the 
substance’s absence.48 Necessary and sufficient causation is difficult to show.49 
The inherent difficulty in the necessary and sufficient approach has led 
environmental and public health agencies to more often regulate using the pub-
lic health approach.50 The public health approach looks to health trends that 
correlate exposure to a substance with an increased risk of disease.51 Here, a 
body of etiologic research must show that the substance is a cause, but not the 
only cause of the disease.52 
The risk assessment approach works best when there is scientific uncer-
tainty about the link between the toxic substance and negative health conse-
quences.53 An agency must determine the level of exposure of the specific sub-
stance, or the “critical value,” required to cause the disease based on the best 
available research.54 The critical value must be sufficiently based in scientific 
                                                                                                                           
 44 See Thimerosal in Vaccines, supra note 5 (outlining the scientific data used by EPA as authori-
ty to regulate emissions and make dietary recommendations). 
 45 Sinks et al., supra note 7, at 64 (defining the three types of causation). 
 46 See id. (illustrating the application of the risk assessment and public health approaches to the 
regulatory efforts of methylmercury and fish consumption). 
 47 Id. The approach may be applied to a specific exposure dosage at which the agency is setting 
the regulatory standard and does not require causation at levels lower than the standard. Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. (defining component causes as those that are linked to the disease but not necessary or suf-
ficient). 
 50 See Fisher, supra note 33, at 131; Sinks et al., supra note 7, at 64. There are inherent difficul-
ties of following a strict risk assessment model for policy-making. See Fisher, supra note 33, at 131. 
 51 Sinks et al., supra note 7, at 64. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 See Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 607, 656 
(1980); Sinks et al., supra note 7, at 64. 
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evidence so as to give the agency the authority to regulate the substance in 
question.55 
In 1980, in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum 
Institute (Benzene Case), the United States Supreme Court overturned the ben-
zene exposure standard promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (“OSHA”) because OSHA’s supporting evidence only linked 
leukemia to levels of benzene above the promulgated standard, but could not 
provide scientific explanation for the standard itself.56 This holding does not 
mandate absolute scientific certainty, but requires agencies to provide substan-
tial evidence to support regulatory standards and reduce uncertainty.57 
C. Regulating Methylmercury: Developing a Safety Standard and 
Navigating Regulations for Environmental and Dietary Concerns 
Early regulation of mercury began when the neurotoxic effects of 
methylmercury became known.58 Findings of methylmercury’s neurotoxicity 
inspired regulation of the dangerous substance at all levels of government.59 
EPA’s effort began with, and continues to focus on, controlling and prohibiting 
the release of methylmercury into the environment.60 
Methylmercury is safe for human exposure at very low levels, which re-
quires EPA to determine and set a maximum safety standard, or critical value.61 
In an effort that blends the public health and risk assessment approaches, EPA 
has conducted comprehensive reviews of the research on methylmercury in 
coordination with the public health agencies.62 The research demonstrates the 
effects of methylmercury exposure at various levels and forms the scientific 
basis for the maximum exposure standard.63 
EPA has broad authority to regulate methylmercury emissions but must 
balance the risk of harm against relevant factors.64 In 2015, in Michigan v. En-
vironmental Protection Agency, the United States Supreme Court held that 
EPA must take cost into consideration when instituting new guidelines for 
                                                                                                                           
 55 See 448 U.S. at 656; Sinks et al., supra note 7, at 64. 
 56 448 U.S. at 611, 656–62 (requiring the agency’s standard be “supported by substantial evi-
dence”). 
 57 See id. at 656; Brian D. Israel, An Environmental Justice Critique of Risk Assessment, 3 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 469, 477 (1995). 
 58 Bigham et al., supra note 1, at 29; Thimerosal in Vaccines, supra note 5. 
 59 Bigham et al., supra note 1, at 28. 
 60 See id. at 29–30 (describing methylmercury regulation). 
 61 Sinks et al., supra note 7, at 64. 
 62 EPA MERCURY REPORT, supra note 4, at 3–12. 
 63 See id. (providing an executive summary of the comprehensive methylmercury report). 
 64 Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 626–27 (1986) (requiring administrative agencies to 
set standards that are rationally connected to the facts); see Michigan v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 135 S. 
Ct. 2699, 2706 (2015) (requiring that EPA take relevant factors as defined by statute into account in 
decision-making). 
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methylmercury emissions from power plants.65 Agencies are not bound to 
make the final decision based on cost, though, and may find that other factors 
reasonably outweigh the financial burden.66 
Human exposure to methylmercury has been linked not just to industrial 
emissions, but also to certain dietary choices.67 Fish consumption has posed an 
interesting challenge to agencies because although EPA can create a safety 
standard for new emissions, it is more difficult to regulate the amount of contam-
inants already present in the environment.68 High levels of individual consump-
tion of certain types of fish may result in levels of methylmercury within the 
human body that exceed the levels the EPA has determined to be safe because 
mercury can accumulate in fish living in contaminated environments pass to 
humans through the food chain.69 Widespread concern about the possible 
health risks associated with consumption of methylmercury-contaminated fish 
has led the PHS agencies to set regulatory standards despite the scientific un-
certainty created by the variable contamination level of individual fish.70 
To limit the risks posed by individual consumption of contaminated fish, 
the agencies developed dietary recommendations that suggested limited amounts 
of fish with high levels of methyl-mercury for high-risk groups, including chil-
dren and pregnant women.71 Unlike emissions regulations, this approach is less 
rigid and requires public education and acceptance to be successful.72 Fright-
ened by EPA’s education campaign extolling the dangers of methylmercury, 
many individuals misunderstood the recommendations and interpreted the guide-
lines to prohibit the consumption of all fish.73 In choosing to avoid all fish, 
these groups miss out on critical nutrients, including those that promote chil-
                                                                                                                           
 65 Michigan v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 135 S. Ct. at 2712 (interpreting cost as within the scope 
EPA’s statutorily mandated “appropriate and necessary” balancing test). 
 66 See id. at 2711. 
 67 See Bigham et al., supra note 1, at 31 (describing the complex challenge of regulating emis-
sions of methylmercury in the food supply because of lack of predictability and scientific knowledge); 
Holden, supra note 9, at 129 (describing the challenges of balancing the two agencies perspectives); 
Sinks et al., supra note 7, at 64 (describing the public health risks that stem from overregulating 
methylmercury in the food supply). 
 68 See Bigham et al., supra note 1, at 31; Mercury in Aquatic Ecosystems, U.S. GEOLOGICAL 
SURVEY (June 3, 2010), http://water.usgs.gov/nawqa/mercury/MercuryFAQ.html [https://perma.cc/
Q2YG-NV4Q]. 
 69 Holden, supra note 9, at 116 (explaining the bioaccumulation process through which mercury 
accumulates in higher concentrations in fish tissue than in air or water and the neurotoxic effects on 
fetuses and young children). 
 70 See Bigham et al., supra note 1, at 31(describing the challenges of balancing the health risks 
and benefits of fish consumption). 
 71 Holden, supra note 9, at 129. 
 72 Id. at 125. 
 73 Id. at 131 (describing the confusion caused by the recommendation and the position supported 
by David Martosko, research director at the Center for Consumer Freedom, to withdraw the recom-
mendation). 
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dren’s growth and fetal development.74 To resolve this issue, the agencies im-
plemented a campaign to educate people about a more balanced approach, 
starting with a revised set of guidelines that provide a maximum as well as a 
minimum recommended level for fish consumption.75 
D. Regulating Ethylmercury: Vaccines, Autism, and Public Panic 
When it comes to mercury, public overreactions have ranged from calls to 
ban specific products to claims of government conspiracy; the agencies have 
failed to address these public outcries.76 Following research linking the use of 
mercury in dental fillings to neurological disorders in patients and dentists, 
government agencies continued to treat the substance as safe and ignored the 
controversy.77 This head-in-the-sand approach—which mirrors the govern-
ment’s recent approach to vaccines—failed to allay fears.78 Recent polls indi-
cate the public remains distrustful of the government’s refusal to regulate the 
components of these fillings.79 
Arguably no movement better demonstrates the risk that comes with fail-
ing to adequately address public concerns about mercury more clearly than the 
debate on the connection between vaccines and Autism Spectrum Disorder.80 
The substance at the heart of the controversy is thimerosal—an ethylmercury-
                                                                                                                           
 74 Fish Advisory, supra note 43. 
 75 Id.; Holden, supra note 9, at 132. Although the agencies continue to approach the issue differ-
ently, EPA and the FDA are publicly supporting the FDA net effects recommendation. Holden, supra 
note 9, at 132. 
 76 See Baga, supra note 33, at 178 (describing the FDA’s inaction with respect to mercury amal-
gam in dental fillings); Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 319 (noting that governmental action in support 
of misunderstandings about mercury entrench the inaccurate information further); Moreno, supra note 
5, at 414–15 (discussing Robert F. Kennedy, Jr.’s pharmaceutical industry conspiracy theory); Offit, 
supra note 11, at 1278–79 (highlighting the extreme and public response to claims that thimerosal in 
vaccines caused autism). 
 77 Baga, supra note 33, at 178. 
 78 Id. at 180 (noting that the FDA recognized evidence of harm but found that there was not 
enough research to support regulation); Chirba-Martin & Welshhans, supra note 3, at 293–94, 298 
(sharing results of a survey of one thousand people finding that fifty percent of respondents believed 
dental mercury has health risks). 
 79 See Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 319 (sharing the results of a 2011 Harris Interactive-
HealthDay poll: 18% of those surveyed believed autism was linked to vaccines and, of the 69% of 
respondents aware of the Wakefield study, only 47% knew of the study’s retraction); Offit, supra note 
11, at 1279 (describing the actions taken by those distrustful of the government’s position, including 
harassment and physical attacks of those supporting the government’s position that thimerosal is a 
safe substance). 
 80 See Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 320; Haertlein, supra note 3, at 226; Offit, supra note 11, at 
1278–79. See Offit, supra note 11, at 1278–79, for a review of the events leading to and following the 
debate on thimerosal in vaccines in the United States. 
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based preservative.81 Ethylmercury is a different substance from methylmercu-
ry, despite the common mercurial base and similar name.82 
In the 1930s, manufacturers added the preservative thimerosal to immun-
izations to minimize vaccine injuries resulting from bacterial and fungal growth 
in the vaccines.83 Economic efficiency was critical to achieving herd immunity 
in the Depression era and to maintain such efficiency manufacturers stored the 
vaccines in multi-use vials.84 Because the vials would often need to be stored 
between uses, a preservative agent was necessary to prevent bacterial contami-
nation.85 Early reports showed the use of thimerosal reduced the risk of bacte-
rial contamination with no apparent side effects.86 The modern advent of sin-
gle-use vaccination vials in the early 2000s made the need for thimerosal practi-
cally nonexistent in the United States and the substance has since been removed 
from almost all vaccines today.87 
The use of thimerosal was called in to question and its public perception 
as safe was destroyed in 1998 when a British scientist, Andrew Wakefield, an-
nounced research (“the Wakefield study” or “the study”) linking the thimero-
                                                                                                                           
 81 Vaccine Testimony, supra note 15; Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 321; Thimerosal in Vaccines, 
supra note 5. 
 82 Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 321 (explaining that ethylmercury does not have the health im-
pact of methylmercury because of the way the human body processes and excretes the substance); 
Moreno, supra note 5, at 412–13 (noting that the amount of ethylmercury used in vaccines has never 
been show to cause mercury toxicity); Offit, supra note 11, at 1278 (“Although these two molecules 
differ by only one carbon atom, the difference isn’t trivial.”); WHO Thimerosal Statement, supra note 
14 (outlining the scientific data distinguishing methylmercury and ethylmercury). 
 83 Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 321; Michael J. Donovan, Note, The Impact of “Hurricane” 
Hannah: The Government’s Decision to Compensate in One Girl’s Vaccine Injury Case Could Dras-
tically Alter the Face of Public Health, 50 JURIMETRICS J. 229, 241 (2010); Offit, supra note 11, at 
1278; Thimerosal in Vaccines, supra note 5.  
 84 Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 321–22 (noting the critical role childhood vaccinations play in 
herd immunity); Donovan, supra note 83, at 236 (defining herd immunity as the idea that, by vaccinat-
ing eighty to ninety percent of the population, the spread of disease is contained); Moreno, supra note 
5, at 415–16 (commenting that the economic and public health concerns that existed in the United 
States during the Depression still exist today in many countries around the world); Thimerosal in 
Vaccines, supra note 5 (discussing the “tragic consequences” that led to thimerosal’s use); see Coal. 
for Mercury-Free Drugs v. Sebelius, 671 F.3d 1275, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (noting that this condition 
exists today with the influenza vaccine because thimerosal is necessary to provide adequate supply at 
a price consumers can afford). 
 85 Thimerosal in Vaccines, supra note 5; see also 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-2 (2012). Statute defines a 
vaccine injury as any adverse reaction caused by a vaccine. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-2. 
 86 Moreno, supra note 5, at 413; Thimerosal in Vaccines, supra note 5. FDA.gov outlines the 
animal and human studies of ethylmercury prior to its use in vaccines demonstrating safety and effec-
tiveness. Thimerosal in Vaccines, supra note 5. 
 87 Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 321; Haertlein, supra note 3, at 218; Moreno, supra note 5, at 
415–16; Thimerosal in Vaccines, supra note 5. Although thimerosal is mostly obsolete in the United 
States, it continues to play an important role in continuing international vaccination programs. More-
no, supra note 5, at 415–16. 
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sal-containing MMR combined vaccine to ASD.88 In the years immediately 
preceding the study, the prevalence rate of ASD grew dramatically, causing fears 
of an epidemic and leading to new research into the cause of ASD.89 The Wake-
field study bolstered the fears of epidemic and, coupled with PHS agencies’ rec-
ommendation for an increase in early childhood vaccinations, led to widespread 
public alarm.90 
In 1999 and 2000, the public health agencies responded to this panic by 
instituting a ban on vaccinations containing thimerosal for children.91 The pre-
cautionary ban resulted from what the agencies saw as a complete lack of re-
search to determine a safe level of thimerosal exposure because, until this time, 
the agencies had categorized thimerosal as a safe product.92 Instead, the agen-
cies looked to what they believed to be the best available data—EPA’s regula-
tory standards for methylmercury.93 
When the agencies sought reference standards for thimerosal, they failed 
to take into account the difference between methylmercury and ethylmercu-
ry—the mercurial compound present in thimerosal.94 EPA’s standards indicated 
the levels at which water, air, and land become toxic due to methylmercury con-
tamination, but the standards did not apply to any other type of mercury or mer-
                                                                                                                           
 88 Donovan, supra note 83, at 231; Moreno, supra note 5, at 409–10; Wakefield et al., supra note 
12, at 641. The Wakefield study was the first to provoke the public awareness that launched the debate 
concerning autism and vaccines, but some publications focus on the FDA’s 1999 review of mercury in 
consumer products as the beginning of the timeline. See Donovan, supra note 83, at 231; Offit, supra 
note 11, at 1278; Wakefield et al., supra note 12, at 641. 
 89 Stefan N. Hansen et al., Explaining the Increase in the Prevalence of Autism Spectrum Disor-
ders: The Proportion Attributable to Changes in Reporting Practices, J. AM. MED. ASS’N PEDIAT-
RICS, Jan. 2015, at 56, 57; Moreno, supra note 5, at 411. “[R]eported autism diagnoses have increased 
from approximately 1 in 10,000 in the 1980s to 1 in 166 in 2003.” Moreno, supra note 5, at 411. 
 90 See Moreno, supra note 5, at 411. Most medical professionals and researchers now point to the 
1994 update to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM-IV”), making di-
agnostic criteria more inclusive, and a heightened awareness of ASD as reasons for the increased rate 
of diagnosis. Hansen, supra note 89, at 57, 60–61; see AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND 
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-IV) § 299.00, 66–71 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinaf-
ter DSM-IV]. This edition broadened the diagnostic criteria for autism from the previously strict crite-
ria that only recognized the most pervasive form. Autism at 70—from Kanner to DSM-5, AUTISM 
SPEAKS (Sept. 19, 2013), https://www.autismspeaks.org/science/science-news/autism-70-–-kanner-
dsm-5 [https://perma.cc/ZXG7-E4ZL]; see DSM-IV, supra. Recent research found a link between the 
increase in ASD prevalence and the change in diagnostic criteria, “most (60%) of the increase in ASD 
prevalence in children born from 1980 through 1991 in Denmark based on registry-reported diagnoses 
can be explained by the change in diagnostic criteria in 1994 and the inclusion of outpatient data to the 
DPR in 1995.” Hansen, supra note 89, at 57, 60–61. 
 91 Vaccine Testimony, supra note 15; Thimerosal in Vaccines, supra note 5. 
 92 21 C.F.R. § 310.545(27)(i) (1990); Offit, supra note 11, at 1278; Thimerosal in Vaccines, su-
pra note 5. Regulations categorize thimerosal as safe in over-the-counter drugs. 21 C.F.R. 
§ 310.545(27)(i). 
 93 Vaccine Testimony, supra note 15; Offit, supra note 11, at 1278; see Moreno, supra note 5, at 
413 (“Advocates of the vaccine-autism link add to the public confusion by ignoring the evidence of 
the different health risks associated with methyl and ethyl mercury.”). 
 94 See Offit, supra note 11, at 1278; see also WHO Thimerosal Statement, supra note 14. 
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cury derivative.95 At the time of investigation, EPA’s standard for a safe 
methylmercury level in humans was 0.1 microgram per kilogram body weight 
per day.96 The agencies calculated the amount of ethylmercury under the rec-
ommended vaccine schedule and found that during the first six months of life, 
children could receive up to 187.5 micrograms of ethylmercury through vac-
cinations.97 Comparing the numbers at face value, the agencies determined that 
the amount of ethylmercury was far above EPA’s limit for methylmercury and 
was therefore unsafe.98 
After lawsuits and widespread fear, spurred on in part by celebrities and 
politicians, the Wakefield study was roundly and decisively discredited as the 
result of bad science and bad ethics.99 This criticism ultimately led to the study’s 
retraction.100 The Wakefield study employed poor scientific protocols, false 
readings from medical devices, and unethically interpreted results.101 Subse-
quent studies funded by private and government entities were unable to replicate 
the results, casting doubt on the findings and disproving the original hypothe-
sis.102 Substantiating the weight of research against the Wakefield study, data 
showed that states and countries with a ban on thimerosal continued to see a 
rise in rates of ASD diagnosis.103 
Based on this new evidence, the agencies reversed their position and rein-
stated their support for all vaccine recommendations with thimerosal, but it 
                                                                                                                           
 95 Bigham et al., supra note 1, at 29–31; see Offit, supra note 11, at 1278. 
 96 Thimerosal in Vaccines, supra note 5. 
 97 Vaccine Testimony, supra note 15; Offit, supra note 11, at 1278. 
 98 Vaccine Testimony, supra note 15; Thimerosal in Vaccines, supra note 5 (“The Committee 
believed that the effort to remove thimerosal from vaccines was ‘a prudent measure in support of the 
public health goal to reduce mercury exposure of infants and children as much as possible.’”). 
99 Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 317; Donovan, supra note 83, at 231; Haertlein, supra note 3, at 
218; Moreno, supra note 5, at 414; Offit, supra note 11, at 1279; Gardiner Harris, Journal Retracts 
1998 Paper Linking Autism to Vaccines, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
02/03/health/research/03lancet.html [https://perma.cc/AHC6-YT7L]. 
 100 Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 317; Donovan, supra note 83, at 231; Haertlein, supra note 3, at 
218; Moreno, supra note 5, at 414; Offit, supra note 11, at 1279; Harris, supra note 99. For an expla-
nation of the widespread criticisms and the ethical concerns leading to the study’s retraction and the 
revocation of Wakefield’s medical license, see Donovan, supra note 83, at 231 and Haertlein, supra 
note 3, at 218. 
 101 Donovan, supra note 83, at 231; Haertlein, supra note 3, at 218; Harris, supra note 99. 
 102 Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 317 (noting that the controversy did not end in the face of a lack 
of scientific support); Moreno, supra note 5, at 414 (highlighting relevant research disproving the 
causal link as well as the scientific challenges to principal anti-vaccine research by Dr. Mark Geier); 
Harris, supra note 99 (announcing the retraction); Thimerosal in Vaccines, supra note 5 (discussing 
two key studies finding no causal link between thimerosal and autism); Timeline: Thimerosal in Vac-
cines (1999–2010), supra note 15 (identifying key studies finding no causal link between thimerosal 
and autism). 
 103 Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 321; Harris, supra note 99. There is evidence that ASD preva-
lence rates have increased after thimerosal bans went into effect in some states and other countries. 
Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 321. 
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was all too little, too late.104 Families brought more than five thousand legal 
claims to the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (“NVICP”) on 
behalf of children diagnosed with ASD after receiving the MMR combined 
vaccine.105 In the special Omnibus Autism Proceeding (“OAP”), the Special 
Master of the United States Court of Federal Claims dismissed all claims for 
failure to prove causation, but this made little difference in the growing public 
panic and misinformation campaigns.106 Parent advocacy groups fought to ban 
all vaccines and the resulting fear-mongering left many children unvaccinated, 
leading to outbreaks of preventable—and fatal—diseases.107 The agencies at-
tempted to quell these fears by requiring all vaccines be available in a thimero-
sal-free version and encouraged manufacturers to remove thimerosal from all 
vaccines.108 
Many people still firmly believed that the discredited Wakefield study was 
correct and the public outrage and fear quickly spread beyond the Wakefield-
implicated MMR combined vaccine to a fear of all vaccines.109 These individu-
als responded to the research, agency reversal, and court decision by arguing 
that a conspiracy existed between the government and vaccine manufactur-
ers.110 No amount of research disproving the autism theory could change 
minds.111 
                                                                                                                           
 104 See Vaccine Testimony, supra note 15; Timeline: Thimerosal in Vaccines (1999–2010), supra 
note 15. 
 105 Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 320; Haertlein, supra note 3, at 219; Moreno, supra note 5, at 
411. The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (“NVICP”) claims offered three theories of 
causation: “(1) MMR vaccines and thimerosal-containing vaccines together cause autism; (2) thimero-
sal-containing vaccines cause autism; and (3) MMR vaccine causes autism.” Barraza et al., supra note 
3, at 320; see also Haertlein, supra note 3, at 219. 
 106 Cedillo v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 98-916V, 2009 WL 331968, at *134 (Fed. Cl. 
Feb. 12, 2009), aff’d, 89 Fed. Cl. 158 (2009), aff’d, 617 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Barraza et al., 
supra note 3, at 320–21; Haertlein, supra note 3, at 212. Cedillo held that “the overall weight of the 
evidence is overwhelmingly contrary to” the theories of causation presented. 2009 WL 331968, at 
*134. 
 107 Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 317–18; Haertlein, supra note 3, at 225; Offit, supra note 11, at 
1279. 
 108 Vaccine Testimony, supra note 15; Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 321; Timeline: Thimerosal 
in Vaccines (1999–2010), supra note 15. 
 109 Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 318–19 (noting that MMR vaccine fears have affected public 
perception of all vaccines and providing example of then presidential-candidate Michelle Bachmann’s 
comments on the risks of the human papillomavirus vaccine, Gardasil, during a presidential debate); 
Offit, supra note 11, at 1279 (noting that MMR vaccine fears have not stopped the use of thimerosal 
in the influenza vaccine). 
 110 Haertlein, supra note 3, at 226 (observing that the vaccine concerns have grown into a belief 
of government and industry conspiracy); Moreno, supra note 5, at 414–15 (discussing Robert F. Ken-
nedy, Jr.’s support of the governmental and industry conspiracy theory). 
 111 Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 317–19 (“Studies finding no unexpected ill health effects rarely 
receive comparable attention.”); Haertlein, supra note 3, at 225 (explaining why the OAP judgment 
did not end the debate of whether there is a causal relationship between autism and vaccines); More-
no, supra note 5, at 415 (“Unfortunately, dangerous beliefs that lack a scientific basis and should be 
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E. Regulating Vaccines: The Administrative Complex 
 Federal regulation of vaccinations is conducted by the United States De-
partment of Health and Human Services (“HHS”).112 State and local govern-
ments also have the power to adopt and implement compulsory vaccination 
laws.113 HHS, though, takes a lead role in policy-making and industry over-
sight.114 HHS develops and enacts public health goals and authorizes the pub-
lic health agencies to take action.115 In the case of immunizations, these public 
health goals require a broad range of activities executed by agencies that are 
subsidiaries of HHS, including the FDA and CDC.116 The FDA has primary 
authority over the approval process for vaccine compounds and inoculation 
devices and the CDC leads research and makes vaccination recommenda-
tions.117 Although each agency has a specific role, the agencies also work to-
gether for larger policy decisions, such as the initial ban and study of thimero-
sal, wherein each agency offers unique expertise and the perspective needed to 
make a final decision.118  
The FDA regulates the active ingredients in vaccines necessary for the 
prevention of disease as well as the inactive substances in the vaccine under 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”).119 The FDA’s authority to regu-
late any substance within its scope is plenary.120 If a substance is found to be 
safe, the FDA has significant discretionary authority to regulate it through the 
FDCA, even going so far as to allow the FDA to prohibit the manufacture of 
any regulated product it deems unsafe.121  
                                                                                                                           
further discredited by this type of flagrant conspiracy-mongering can survive and flourish.”); see Of-
fit, supra note 11, at 1279 (sharing that the perceived link between thimerosal and ASD is so firmly 
held that many children undergo a dangerous mercury poisoning treatment known as chelation in an 
attempt to cure their autism). 
 112 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2012). 
 113 Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 316; Donovan, supra note 83, at 230. 
 114 42 U.S.C. § 242k (2012) (authorizing the agencies under the Department of Health and Human 
Services (“HHS”) to take the regulatory actions necessary to protect public health). 
 115 Id. § 242k(b) (outlining the responsibilities of HHS). 
 116 See Thimerosal in Vaccines, supra note 5 (indicating the lead agencies are the FDA and the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)). 
 117 42 U.S.C. §§ 262–264. (designating HHS authority of “biological products,” including im-
munizations, and authority to regulate the “communicable diseases”). 
 118 See Vaccine Testimony, supra note 15; Thimerosal in Vaccines, supra note 5. The testimony 
provides an overview of the roles of the FDA and CDC in vaccine regulation. Vaccine Testimony, 
supra note 15. 
 119 42 U.S.C. § 262 (granting the authority to regulate biologics to the Secretary of HHS); Vac-
cine Testimony, supra note 15 (summarizing the FDA’s pre- and post-licensure role in vaccine regula-
tion). 
 120 See Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000). 
 121 21 U.S.C. § 321(u) (2012); See id. § 355; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 
137 (“Congress, however, has foreclosed the removal of tobacco products from the market.”). 
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In 2000, the United States Supreme Court in Food & Drug Administration 
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. held that this discretion is only limited in 
the case of preemption by Congress.122 Rejecting the FDA attempt to assert 
regulatory authority over tobacco products, the Court held that Congress 
preempted tobacco regulation from FDA authority by granting these powers to 
other agencies.123 The Court’s discussion of the agency’s power establishes that 
so long as a regulated substance falls within the scope of the FDCA, and Con-
gress has not granted authority to another agency, a court conducting judicial 
review of an agency decision will give deference to the agency’s action.124 
Vaccinations are considered “biological products” under the FDCA, there-
fore, the FDA has the statutory authority to conduct thorough review and ap-
proval for all new vaccines and to promulgate general standards of safety.125 
Because vaccines are commonly employed to tackle existent or imminent pub-
lic health threats, such as the flu vaccine that is modified annually to target the 
expected strains, these substances typically experience an expedited review.126 
The FDCA and implementing regulations set requirements for all vaccines so 
that the agency need only approve the active ingredient.127 These requirements 
mandate the use of a “sufficiently nontoxic” preservative.128 The FDA may 
also conduct a post-approval safety review even when it had no requirement of 
a risk evaluation at the time the vaccine was approved.129 
The CDC’s role in vaccinations focuses on the study of communicable 
diseases and the use of approved vaccines.130 The CDC recommends vaccina-
tion standards, such as which vaccines states should mandate for school-age 
children and high-risk groups, by tracking and developing prevention strate-
gies for communicable diseases.131 The agency then evaluates these recom-
                                                                                                                           
 122 529 U.S. at 161. 
 123 Id. at 137–39 (explaining the pattern of congressional intent to limit the FDA’s authority for 
tobacco regulation). 
 124 See id. at 126, 137–38, 159–60. 
 125 42 U.S.C. § 262(i) (2012). 
 126 See Vaccine Testimony, supra note 15 (describing the unique timeline of the annual influenza 
vaccine). 
 127 42 U.S.C. § 262 (granting the FDA the authority to approve active ingredients); 21 C.F.R. 
§ 310.545(27)(i) (2016) (defining thimerosal as an ingredient not regulated despite “inadequate data to 
establish general recognition of the safety and effectiveness of these ingredients for the specified uses”). 
 128 See 21 C.F.R. § 610.15(a) (2016). 
 129 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(2)(A). 
 130 Id. § 300aa-2 (mandating safe childhood vaccinations); see also id. § 242k (describing broader 
HHS powers that may be delegated to the CDC). 
 131 Id. § 300aa-2(a)(1) (mandate requires CDC participation in the safety assessment of childhood 
vaccinations); see also id. § 264 (outlining HHS’s responsibilities to “control communicable diseases” 
that may be delegated to CDC); Vaccination Strategies for High-Risk Adults, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CON-
TROL & PREVENTION (May 2, 2016), http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/adults/for-practice/highrisk-strat.
html [https://perma.cc/W3L9-VSR3] (defining high-risk groups as adults with specific medical condi-
tions, healthcare workers, and individuals with high-risk behaviors). 
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mendations based on the rate that the disease occurs without vaccination, also 
known as its incidence rate.132 Additionally, the CDC works with the FDA’s 
Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research program to track vaccine injury 
reports on the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (“VAERS”), a con-
sumer tool for incident reporting.133 
II. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION RESPONSE TO THE 
VACCINE CONTROVERSY: REASONABLE PROCESS TO PROTECT  
THE PUBLIC HEALTH OR A POLITICALLY MOTIVATED  
OVERREACTION CAUSING MORE HARM? 
When faced with a critical decision on public health, the default position 
for vaccine regulation is to proceed under the precautionary principle.134 In the 
case of ethylmercury, caution bred fear and created a greater public health 
risk—the loss of herd immunity due to decreasing vaccination rates.135 The 
decision by the public health agencies (collectively the CDC, FDA and others, 
“Public Health Service,” “the PHS agencies,” or “the agencies”) to ban thi-
merosal based on a flawed comparison to the methylmercury standard used by 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was not based on a thorough as-
sessment of the scientific data available.136 The subsequent decision to reverse 
the ban without a comprehensive understanding of thimerosal’s safety and 
without regard to the public’s confusion failed to rebuild confidence in vac-
cinations.137 
A. The Precautionary Ban on the Use of Thimerosal in Vaccines Ignored 
the Substantial Evidence Standard Required in Substance Regulation 
In 2015, the United States Supreme Court held in Industrial Union De-
partment, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute (Benzene Case) that agen-
                                                                                                                           
 132 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-2(a)(7); see also id. § 242k. Section 242k (outlining the HHS public health 
research responsibilities that may be delegated to CDC). 
 133 Vaccine Testimony, supra note 15. 
 134 See id.; Fisher, supra note 33, at 127–28; Israel, supra note 57, at 480; Offit, supra note 11, at 
1279. Agency testimony describes the reasoning behind the precautionary response of the public 
health agencies. See Vaccine Testimony, supra note 15. The scientific community challenges this 
reasoning, noting that “the precautionary principle assumes that there is no harm in exercising cau-
tion.” Offit, supra note 11, at 1279 (emphasis added). 
 135 See Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 319; Haertlein, supra note 3, at 230; Moreno, supra note 5, 
at 412, 414–25; Offit, supra note 11, at 1279. Offit identifies several other predictable legal, political, 
and public health outcomes that should have been considered in the decision-making process. Offit, 
supra note 11, at 1279. 
 136 See infra notes 138–167 and accompanying text. 
 137 See Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 319; Moreno, supra note 5, at 412–13; Offit, supra note 11, 
at 1279. Moreno argues by analogy to the courts that a review of medical literature and statistical data 
should guide mercury regulation. Moreno, supra note 5, at 412–13. 
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cies may only regulate exposure to a substance by setting a standard level of 
exposure based on relevant factors, such as “substantial evidence” and cost.138 
Complete elimination is rarely possible, or even necessary, and the standard 
must be the highest level of exposure, based on “substantial evidence,” at 
which the substance is safe.139 Evidence of harm may be available before there 
is substantial evidence supporting an appropriate standard of exposure, there-
fore the Court found that an agency may set a precautionary standard so long 
as it is based on “reputable scientific thought.”140 The Court’s holding in Mich-
igan v. Environmental Protection Agency defines the required process to de-
termine an appropriate standard level of exposure as “reasoned decision mak-
ing” that must be based on pertinent information.141 
In an attempt to quell public panic, the agencies improperly relied on the 
precautionary principle during the Autism Spectrum Disorder (autism or “ASD”) 
controversy by ignoring the vast amount of available relevant scientific and vac-
cine tracking data.142 Several human and animal studies available at the time 
indicated that there was no mercury toxicity risk related to vaccines except in 
doses of more than one thousand times the standard thimerosal dose.143 These 
studies indicate that ethylmercury may have a critical value that requires the 
agencies to set a standard level of exposure, but the agencies did not rely on 
these studies.144 
The ethylmercury toxicity studies do not support use of the EPA’s 
methylmercury standard because these studies suggest a safe level of exposure 
for ethylmercury that is much higher than the critical value for methylmercu-
ry.145 Even with access to evidence that the substances had vastly different tox-
                                                                                                                           
 138 See Indus. Union Dept’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 607, 656 
(1980); see Michigan v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706 (2015). Michigan v. Environmen-
tal Protection Agency held that “agency action is lawful only if it rests ‘on a consideration of the rele-
vant factors.’” 135 S. Ct. at 2706. 
 139 See Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 656. 
 140 See id. 
 141 Michigan v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 135 S. Ct. at 2706 (requiring agencies to use “reasoned deci-
sionmaking” when setting exposure standards). 
 142 See Offit, supra note 11, at 1279 (challenging the agencies’ precautionary response); Vaccine 
Testimony, supra note 15 (sharing the initial review of data showed no risk of toxicity from thimero-
sal from the amount of vaccinations recommended in the current immunization schedule); Thimerosal 
in Vaccines, supra note 5 (identifying the specific relevant studies). 
 143 Vaccine Testimony, supra note 15 (showing that the agencies relied on EPA’s methylmercury 
standard instead of the ethylmercury data); Thimerosal in Vaccines, supra note 5 (compiling the re-
sults of several studies and reports of thimerosal safety, including: a 1931 human study finding no 
toxicity with exposure levels “up to [twenty-six] milligrams thimerosal/kg” and the only cases of 
acute mercury poisoning from thimerosal at exposure of “approximately [three] mg/kg to several 
hundred mg/kg . . . 1000 times the proper dose of thimerosal as a preservative”). 
 144 Thimerosal in Vaccines, supra note 5. 
 145 Id. (noting that the data offers doses higher than the total in the immunization schedule that 
showed with no toxicity and significantly higher doses with toxicity, indicating that there may be a 
threshold amount that is safe for human health); see Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 655 (requiring con-
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icity levels, the agencies’ use of EPA’s methylmercury standard made the same 
error overturned under the Benzene Case—setting an exposure standard at a 
level far below the level the “substantial evidence” suggested without any 
“reputable scientific thought” to support such a deviation.146 The agencies 
failed to apply substantial evidence to make their decision properly.147 
The agencies also ignored the National Vaccine Injury Compensation 
Program (“NVICP”) in favor of the consumer-sourced Vaccine Adverse Event 
Reporting System (“VAERS”) data; however the proper methodology for the 
agencies was to review both sources in order to ascertain a comprehensive pic-
ture of the risks not demonstrated by other research.148 The VAERS resource 
relies on voluntary submissions that are not verified and are intended only as a 
rough estimate of incidence rates, these characteristics have caused scholars to 
question the reliability of the data set.149 NVICP provides data on the injury 
and symptoms for review by medical staff at the United States Department of 
Health and Human Services (“HHS”).150 This review process makes the data 
statistically more reliable.151 Reviewing both sources for indications of a caus-
al link to autism is the most thorough methodology because, taken together, the 
data sets provide data that is both quantitatively and qualitatively significant.152 
                                                                                                                           
servative standards be based on “reputable scientific thought”); Moreno, supra note 5, at 412–13 (re-
viewing the scientific research distinguishing the health effects of methylmercury from ethylmercury, 
particularly with respect to the human body’s ability to process and excrete each compound); Sinks et 
al., supra note 7, at 65–66 (describing the challenges of regulating based on uncertain or unknown 
scientific data). 
 146 See Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 656, 662 (requiring agencies to base exposure levels on “sub-
stantial evidence,” which requires the “best available evidence” and may be based on “conservative 
assumptions . . . supported by a body of reputable scientific thought” where concrete evidence is una-
vailable); Thimerosal in Vaccines, supra note 5 (EPA’s methylmercury standard: 0.1 micrograms/
kilograms/day; lowest dose from which ethylmercury caused toxicity: approximately 3 milligrams/
kilogram or 3,000 micrograms/kilogram). 
 147 See Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 656, 662; Thimerosal in Vaccines, supra note 5. 
 148 See Fisher, supra note 33, at 128; Mary Holland et al., Unanswered Questions from the Vac-
cine Injury Compensation Program: A Review of Compensated Cases of Vaccine-Induced Brain Inju-
ry, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 480, 531 (2011). Holland argues that the NVICP claims are a valuable 
resource in the autism/vaccine link. Holland et al., supra, at 531. 
 149 VAERS Data, VACCINE ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING SYS., https://vaers.hhs.gov/data/index 
[https://perma.cc/LVZ3-4GTJ] (disclosing the limitations of Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting Sys-
tem (“VAERS”) data, including voluntary sources and frequency of missing details and errors). 
 150 See Haertlein, supra note 3, at 230; Holland et al., supra note 148, at 503–27; National Vac-
cine Injury Compensation Program, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.: HEALTH RES. & 
SERVS. ADMIN. (Mar. 2017), https://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation [https://perma.cc/FTN7-
VKX2]. 
 151 See Haertlein, supra note 3, at 230 (arguing that the NVICP allows for a more flexible stand-
ard of causation appropriate for the unique cases of vaccine injury); Holland et al., supra note 148, at 
503–27 (describing study of the NVICP compensated claims for autism-like symptoms conducted by 
Pace Law School); National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, supra note 150 (explaining the 
process for NVICP claims). 
 152 See Haertlein, supra note 3, at 230 (illustrating that the NVICP claims provide a more flexible 
evidentiary standard that indicates claims may have been brought for ASD symptoms in the past); 
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B. The Agencies’ Reliance on the Wakefield Study Is Contrary to the Legal 
Requirements of Causation and the Scientific Method 
The legal elements of causation and the scientific method were ignored 
when the agencies issued a ban on thimerosal in vaccines based on a single 
study with an uncorroborated result.153 Scientific causation requires results in 
multiple studies, relevant dose-response evidence, and specificity.154 Regula-
tors must apply these factors to new data before imposing new standards be-
cause, even with a full understanding of the data, there would still be gaps be-
tween the law and scientific reality.155 
The basic principles of scientific research require that a study’s results 
prove true upon replication by other scientists in order to ensure the study’s 
reliability.156 Without consistent results in multiple studies, which did not exist 
at the time of the precautionary ban, the 1998 study conducted by British sci-
entist Andrew Wakefield (“the Wakefield study” or “the study”) is not suffi-
ciently reliable to show causation and should not be used to support regula-
tion.157 The Wakefield study also lacked dose-response data, leaving the agen-
cies to fill in the gaps with the irrelevant methylmercury standard.158 
The immediate reaction to concerns about ethylmercury shows the rash 
nature of the public health agencies’ decision.159 Regulating a substance based 
on a lower standard of causation was intended to be overly protective but ef-
fectively removed the causation requirement from public health regulation.160 
In contrast, EPA did not impose its methylmercury regulations until the agency 
could prove the substance caused neurological impairments.161 
                                                                                                                           
Holland et al., supra note 148, at 494–95 (noting that, although autism was not listed as a disorder until 
the 1980 publication of the third edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, relevant symptoms were indicated as early as the 1940s and 
attributed to other disorders). 
 153 See Sinks et al., supra note 7, at 63. 
 154 Bigham et al., supra note 1, at 26; Sinks et al., supra note 7, at 63. 
 155 See Sinks et al., supra note 7, at 66 (discussing the difficulties of legislating with limited sci-
entific knowledge in an area of scientific uncertainty). 
 156 See Joe G. Hollingsworth & Eric G. Lasker, The Case Against Differential Diagnosis: Daubert, 
Medical Causation Testimony, and the Scientific Method, 37 J. HEALTH L. 85, 90 (2004); Sinks et al., 
supra note 7, at 63.  
 157 Hollingsworth & Lasker, supra note 156, at 103; Sinks et al., supra note 7, at 63; see Thimero-
sal in Vaccines, supra note 5. Subsequent actions by the agency indicate that these elements were 
fulfilled. See Thimerosal in Vaccines, supra note 5. 
 158 Sinks et al., supra note 7, at 63; Thimerosal in Vaccines, supra note 5. 
 159 See Fisher, supra note 33, at 128; Sinks et al., supra note 7, at 64. In contrast, some favor 
cautious regulation to balance all relevant parties and information as a general preference. See Sinks et 
al., supra note 7, at 64. 
 160 See Fisher, supra note 33, at 127–28; Sinks et al., supra note 7, at 64. There is a critical need 
for causation before regulating. See Sinks et al., supra note 7, at 64. 
 161 See Bigham et al., supra note 1, at 26–27 (noting that the United States has been slow to regu-
late mercury, even in comparison to the United Kingdom or France). 
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C. The Decision to Support a Precautionary Ban Failed to  
Balanced the Relevant Factors 
In addition to this flawed risk assessment, the agencies’ public health ap-
proach failed when its balancing test used irrelevant factors and weighed the 
wrong risks.162 A reasonable and precautionary test would have examined the 
consequences of the ban against the risk defined in the Wakefield study.163 This 
type of analysis is the standard protocol when determining vaccine regula-
tions.164 In this test, the consequences of not vaccinating children, specifically 
an increased risk of outbreak and fatality and a decrease in the ability to ensure 
herd immunity, are weighed against the risk of increased prevalence of ASD.165 
Although an ASD diagnosis has pervasive consequences on an individual’s 
life, it is not fatal and does not present a contagious risk to public health like 
the diseases prevented by vaccinations.166 The agencies nonetheless merely 
weighed the risk of an increased incidence of ASD against the hope of decreas-
ing the incidence rate of ASD and ignored the public health risks entirely.167 
D. The Decision to Reverse the Ban Failed to Meet the Critical  
Public Health Needs of Vaccination Policy 
The public reaction—and overreaction—to the Wakefield study and the 
government’s subsequent actions should serve as a cautionary tale not simply 
for future regulatory actions, but also for resolution of the broader vaccine de-
                                                                                                                           
 162 See Michigan v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 135 S. Ct. at 2706; Offit, supra note 11, at 1279. For a 
suggestion of the correct risks for consideration, see Offit, supra note 11, at 1279. 
 163 See Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 316 (providing an analogous balancing test for water fluor-
idation where potential cosmetic risks where outweighed by benefits to public health); Offit, supra 
note 11, at 1279 (identifying predictable harms caused by the precautionary ban). 
 164 See Vaccine Testimony, supra note 15 (describing the balancing test for the influenza vaccine 
as the public and individual health benefits against “the theoretical risk” from thimerosal); Medicare 
and Medicaid Programs; Condition of Participation: Immunization Standard for Long Term Care 
Facilities, 70 Fed. Reg. 58,834, 58,839 (Oct. 7, 2005) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 483) (speaking 
to concerns about vaccine injury associated with the influenza vaccine, the FDA responded to public 
comment balancing the risk associated with failure to vaccinate against the risk of vaccine injury). 
 165 Vaccine Testimony, supra note 15 (explaining that the decision-making process leading to the 
ban weighed the risks of autism against the benefits of vaccination); Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 
309 (identifying the potential public health risk from decreased vaccination rates); see Offit, supra 
note 11, at 1279 (describing the factors and public health risks that should be weighed against “a theo-
retical (and now disproved) risk”). 
 166 Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 308–09, 321–22 (discussing the wide spread and potentially 
fatal risk of losing herd immunity); Moreno, supra note 5, at 409 (describing the parental fears associ-
ated with an ASD diagnosis); Offit, supra note 11, at 1279 (explaining the real public health risk 
through examples of overreaction and fatal failure to vaccinate). 
 167 See Offit, supra note 11, at 1278. 
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bate.168 When the Wakefield study was announced, it revealed a massive 
knowledge gap in the agencies that were charged with regulation because there 
was so little research on ethylmercury that might give the agencies a reference 
point to determine a safety standard.169 This information gap showed a need 
for research on ethylmercury’s critical value and its potential negative effects, 
as well as a lack of understanding of how public reaction could morph into a 
much more significant public health problem.170 
The knowledge gap regarding the safety of ethylmercury exists even to-
day.171 Although there is a breadth of scientific evidence disproving the claim 
of ASD causation, no recent evidence proves that ethylmercury is safe or what 
level of exposure causes mercury toxicity.172 In the face of public panic and 
decreasing vaccination rates, merely disproving a single harm is insufficient to 
change perception.173 Therefore, the decision to categorize ethylmercury as 
safe at any level of exposure after disproving only one harm was unreasonable 
and dangerous.174 Although acting based on insufficient data may have felt 
necessary in the face of public panic, it is time for the agencies to study ethyl-
mercury in depth.175 
The misunderstanding of how the public would react to a rapid and sub-
stantial policy shift was underestimated in the ASD controversy.176 In an effort 
                                                                                                                           
 168 Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 317–19; Moreno, supra note 5, at 415–16; Offit, supra note 11, 
at 1279. For a discussion of the international public health ripple effects that should be considered in 
any balancing test, see Moreno, supra note 5, at 415–16. 
 169 Thimerosal in Vaccines, supra note 5 (describing available data); see Sinks et al., supra note 
7, at 66 (describing problems when regulators are charged with scientific decisions). 
 170 See Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 656 (holding that agencies may use “conservative assumptions” 
only if “they are supported by a body of reputable scientific thought”); Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 
319 (highlighting public opinion polls showing the prevalence of the controversy as evidence that the 
public does not view risk through scientific principles); Offit, supra note 11, at 1279 (emphasizing the 
need for clearly understanding the potential public reaction). 
 171 See Vaccine Testimony, supra note 15; Offit, supra note 11, at 1279. 
 172 See 21 C.F.R. § 310.545(27)(i) (1990) (identifying thimerosal among ingredients with “inade-
quate data to establish general recognition of the safety and effectiveness”); Thimerosal in Vaccines, 
supra note 5 (reporting that no research into other toxicity risks was published since 1996). 
 173 See Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 317–18, 320 (describing the various challenges to vaccina-
tions not directly associated with autism claims, including “immune system overload” and the belief 
that it is unnecessary to vaccinate for diseases with low occurrence); Offit, supra note 11, at 1279 
(stating the negative impact of failure to concretely prove safety); Thimerosal in Vaccines, supra note 
5 (stating that past data indicates safety except at high doses). 
 174 See Michigan v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 135 S. Ct. at 2707–08; Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 
319; Offit, supra note 11, at 1278. The reaction to the initial ban is credited with spawning the current 
distrust, “[c]ritics wondered how removing something that hadn’t been found to be unsafe could make 
vaccines safer.” See Offit, supra note 11, at 1278. 
 175 See Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 319; Offit, supra note 11, at 1279. 
 176 See Vaccine Testimony, supra note 15; Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 319; Offit, supra note 
11, at 1278. The Acting Director’s 2004 testimony demonstrates the continued confusion by agencies 
on how to deal with public perception. See Vaccine Testimony, supra note 15. The testimony priori-
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to respond quickly and to quell public fears, the agencies inadvertently fanned 
the flames of distrust by validating a study that had not yet been reviewed by 
the scientific community.177 In subsequently reversing their position, the agen-
cies took for granted that the public’s blind trust would continue.178 Instead, 
communities became skeptical upon receiving mixed messages from agencies.179 
The agencies worked hard over the past decade to ensure that there is pub-
lic awareness regarding the inaccuracy of the Wakefield study but they have con-
tinued to put out mixed messages on the safety of thimerosal and failed to con-
duct research to determine ethylmercury’s critical value.180 The decision to de-
regulate thimerosal was undermined by the PHS agencies’ simultaneous rec-
ommendation that manufacturers remove the substance from vaccines.181 Fur-
thermore, the Omnibus Autism Proceeding (“OAP”) dismissal, which held that 
plaintiffs could not support a claim because the research did not prove causa-
tion, was intended to provide uniformity but was contradicted by at least one 
NVICP claim, granting damages for vaccine injuries that included ASD.182 
Focusing on discrediting one study, while ignoring the broader question of 
whether ethylmercury is safe, is the reason the agencies’ efforts to calm public 
fear have failed to resolve, and may even be fueling, the growing public health 
concern.183 
Federal agencies are aware that their recommendations have weight and 
can often be taken to an extreme.184 The fish consumption recommendation 
regarding methylmercury demonstrates that such a reaction to thimerosal was 
foreseeable to the public health agencies.185 Therefore, the agencies must re-
structure their decision-making process and begin comprehensive research in 
                                                                                                                           
tizes calming public fears over educating on vaccine safety. See id. This is especially confusing be-
cause the testimony is intended to defend the safety of thimerosal in the influenza vaccine. See id. 
 177 See Vaccine Testimony, supra note 15; Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 319. 
 178 See Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 319; Offit, supra note 11, at 1279. 
 179 See Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 317–18; Haertlein, supra note 3, at 226; Moreno, supra 
note 5, at 414–15; Offit, supra note 11, at 1279. Such skepticism is linked to the rampant public push 
to utilize a philosophical exemption after the ban on thimerosal was lifted. See Barraza et al., supra 
note 3, at 317–18. 
 180 See Vaccine Testimony, supra note 15; Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 319, 321. For instance, 
testimony from the Acting Director of the Office of Vaccines Research and Review supported thimer-
osal’s safety, but also touted the removal of thimerosal. Vaccine Testimony, supra note 15. 
 181 See Vaccine Testimony, supra note 15; Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 321; Thimerosal in 
Vaccines, supra note 5. 
 182 Donovan, supra note 83, at 229; Haertlein, supra note 3, at 219. 
 183 See Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 318–19, 321–23 (noting the need for “effective public 
health education and advocacy” to combat the public’s fear); Moreno, supra note 5, at 417 (noting that 
the inconsistent message about thimerosal’s safety followed by its removal from the market caused a 
decrease in vaccination rates); Offit, supra note 11, at 1279 (noting the impact of mixed messages on 
professionals and the public). 
 184 See Holden, supra note 9, at 131; Sinks et al., supra note 7, at 64.  
 185 See Holden, supra note 9, at 127–28. 
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order to define the critical value for regulation or concretely prove ethylmercu-
ry’s safety.186 
III. A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO SET A STANDARD FOR ETHYLMERCURY 
CAN RESOLVE THE PUBLIC’S VACCINE DISTRUST 
Following such a controversial regulatory process, it may be an unreasona-
ble risk to public health to ask the American people to trust a label describing 
ethylmercury as safe.187 Any action taken to resolve the question of vaccine safe-
ty must be transparent, evidence-based, and thorough.188 To meet this goal, the 
public health agencies must first structure the tasks to match the expertise of 
each agency.189 Only then will they be prepared to take on the challenge of con-
ducting the comprehensive research and public education program necessary.190 
A. Restructuring Responsibilities: Matching the Role  
to the Agency Expertise 
The United States Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) 
must first allocate responsibilities among the public health agencies (collec-
tively the CDC, FDA and others, “Public Health Service,” “the PHS agencies,” 
or “the agencies”) more appropriately.191 A complete reorganization of the fed-
eral administrative state is not required; rather, this public health crisis warrants a 
reassessment of each agency’s use of its authority.192 HHS must utilize the core 
of each agency’s expertise to ensure that the actions are properly executed and 
each agency is held accountable for its role.193 
The emergency situation presented by the now retracted study (“the study” 
or “the Wakefield study”) linking the vaccine to Autism Spectrum Disorder (au-
tism or “ASD”) followed the standard risk assessment model, which hypotheti-
cally made sense but resulted in substantial practical problems.194 The structure 
                                                                                                                           
 186 See infra notes 190–247 and accompanying text. 
 187 See Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 325 (“The culture of denialism, if left unchecked, will in-
creasingly risk harm to the public’s health.”); Haertlein, supra note 3, at 225–26 (citing Justice Ste-
phen Breyer’s assertion that the law must stay “within the boundaries of scientifically sound 
knowledge”); Moreno, supra note 5, at 417 (highlighting Justice Breyer’s discussion of the intersec-
tion of law and science, “the law must seek decisions that fall within the boundaries of scientifically 
sound knowledge and approximately reflect the scientific state of the art”); Offit, supra note 11, at 
1279 (describing the challenges to wide acceptance that thimerosal is safe after the ban). 
 188 See infra notes 190–247 and accompanying text. 
 189 See infra notes 190–230 and accompanying text. 
 190 See infra notes 231–247 and accompanying text. 
 191 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-27 (2012); see Timeline: Thimerosal in Vaccines (1999–2010), supra note 15. 
 192 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-2, 300aa-27. 
 193 See id.; EPA MERCURY REPORT, supra note 4, at 3–12. 
 194 See Fisher, supra note 33, at 129–30 (identifying the common problems that occur when agen-
cies use the risk assessment model). 
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used to make the initial decision to ban thimerosal was a combination of all pub-
lic health agencies, with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) attempting to address the issue, 
both individually and jointly.195 This all-hands-on-deck approach resulted in a 
chaotic process, a flawed outcome, and a dearth of agency accountability.196 To 
support an open and efficient sharing of resources and expertise between agen-
cies, there must be one lead agency to consolidate all information, make the 
final decision, and be accountable to the public.197 
The CDC’s de facto leadership initially made sense because the ques-
tion—did thimerosal in vaccines create an epidemic of autism—was directly 
within the agency’s expertise.198 Under this construct, the CDC should utilize 
the resources of the other agencies, but rely on its own expertise as the final 
decision maker.199 In hindsight, the question should have been whether thimer-
osal was safe at the level of exposure because, in reality, there was no epidemic 
caused by using thimerosal as a vaccine preservative.200 The recalibrated ques-
tion shows that the FDA should have led the decision-making process.201 
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) directly authorizes the 
FDA to regulate “drugs,” “devices,” or “biological products.”202 If a substance 
fits within one of those categories, the agency must first determine if it is safe 
and then regulate the substance under the agencies’ discretion.203 Vaccines, as a 
whole, are explicitly defined as a “biological product” under the FDCA and 
therefore the FDA possesses regulatory authority over vaccines.204 The FDA’s 
authority to regulate thimerosal, though, does not directly fall within the FDA’s 
authority because thimerosal itself is not a biological product, only a compo-
nent of one.205 Similarly, it cannot be regulated as a “drug” because thimerosal 
is not intended to “cure . . . or prevent” disease, it does not directly “affect . . . 
                                                                                                                           
 195 See Vaccine Testimony, supra note 15; Thimerosal in Vaccines, supra note 5. 
 196 See Vaccine Testimony, supra note 15 (describing the efforts as appropriate); Thimerosal in 
Vaccines, supra note 5 (describing the multi-agency actions leading to and following the ban). 
 197 See Holden, supra note 9, at 104; Israel, supra note 57, at 516. When multiple agencies regu-
late a single area the need for agencies to compromise and consolidate efforts can create a tragedy of 
the commons problem. Holden, supra note 9, at 104. 
 198 See Thimerosal in Vaccines, supra note 5. 
 199 See id. 
 200 Hansen, supra note 89, 60–61 (concluding that the increased prevalence of ASD was the result 
of “the change in diagnostic criteria”). 
 201 See Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2012) (creating the FDA and 
granting it authority over vaccine regulation); Vaccine Testimony, supra note 15 (defining the FDA’s 
role in vaccine regulation as reviewing and approving safety of compounds used). 
 202 21 U.S.C. § 353(g); 42 U.S.C. § 262(i) (2012); see Vaccine Testimony, supra note 15. 
 203 21 U.S.C. § 353(g); 42 U.S.C. § 262(i); see Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 134 (2000). 
 204 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(1). 
 205 Id. 
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the body,” and does not act as a “component” in either of the preceding aims 
and, therefore, does not meet the statutory definition of a drug.206  
 The FDA nonetheless has authority to regulate thimerosal as a “de-
vice.”207 Thimerosal is a device under the authority of the FDA because it is 
part of a preventive vaccine but does not have a role in the vaccine’s disease 
prevention within the body.208 Historically, thimerosal was used to prevent 
contamination and vaccine injury in multi-dose vaccine vials.209 The primary 
purpose, then, is achieved within the vial rather than in or on the body and, as 
such, thimerosal falls squarely within the statutory definition of a device.210 
Although thimerosal meets the statutory definition of device because it is a 
means of preserving the vaccine but has no impact on the vaccine’s prevention 
of disease, its obsolescence in single use vials may limit this interpretation as 
its purpose is no longer essential.211  
 If the FDA does not have the statutory authority to regulate thimerosal as 
a device it may be able to do so within the scope of its own regulations, which 
require regulation of all “preservatives” in biological products.212 Agency 
regulations mandate that “[a]ny preservative used shall be sufficiently nontoxic 
so that the amount present in the recommended dose of the product will not be 
toxic to the recipient.”213 Therefore, if the FDA allows even one vaccine to use 
thimerosal, it must prove that the substance is not toxic at the level used in 
vaccines.214 
Whether its authority to regulate thimerosal comes under the FDCA, the 
FDCA’s implementing regulations, or both, the FDA must determine whether 
ethylmercury is safe or at what level it becomes toxic.215 The FDA, because of 
its expertise should be the lead regulatory agency and be held accountable to 
                                                                                                                           
 206 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(g)(1)(B)–321(g)(1)(D). 
 207 Id. §§ 321(h), 353. 
 208 42 U.S.C. § 262(i). 
 209 Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 321. 
 210 Id. 
 211 See Coal. for Mercury-Free Drugs v. Sebelius, 671 F.3d 1275, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (discuss-
ing the continued need for thimerosal in influenza vaccines); Barraza et al., supra note 3, at 321 (not-
ing the removal of thimerosal from most childhood vaccines). But see Vaccine Testimony, supra note 
15 (indicating the continued need for multi-dose influenza vaccine); Moreno, supra note 5, at 415–16 
(identifying a potential international public health crisis if the pharmaceutical industry is unwilling to 
manufacture the thimerosal containing vaccines because multi-dose vials are still used in many coun-
tries outside of the United States). 
 212 21 C.F.R. §§ 310.545, 610.15(a) (2016); Thimerosal in Vaccines, supra note 5. For an over-
view of the historical need for vaccine preservative and the decision to mandate them in 1968 see 
Thimerosal in Vaccines, supra note 5. 
 213 21 C.F.R. § 610.15(a) (emphasis added). 
 214 See id. 
 215 See Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 607, 662 
(1980); Thimerosal in Vaccines, supra note 5. Available studies indicate that ethylmercury may have 
a critical value. See Thimerosal in Vaccines, supra note 5. 
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the public for all decisions.216 The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), 
CDC, and the other public health agencies should work in consultation with 
the FDA to ensure a comprehensive source of knowledge.217 
A comprehensive ethylmercury study is not a novel concept and the Na-
tional Toxicology Program (“NTP”) and Interagency Committee for Chemical 
Evaluation and Coordination (“ICCEC”) has recommended this type of project 
since the early 2000s.218 Additionally, similar studies on mercurial substances, 
such as methylmercury have been undertaken by EPA for decades, providing 
timely research, explanations for updated exposure standards, and description 
of future plans for research and public communication.219 Such reviews of tox-
ic substances are generally brought on only when the substance is shown to 
cause health risks.220 With ethylmercury, the failure to provide clear, compre-
hensive information on the risks associated, not the substance itself, caused a 
health risk by decreasing vaccination rates.221 Such a health risk, though non-
traditional, warrants a more targeted and active research approach.222 
A comprehensive ethylmercury study should follow the structure imple-
mented by EPA in their study of methylmercury.223 The first step is to conduct 
a scientific literature review that looks at all available scientific data on ethyl-
mercury and use this information to identify areas where further research is 
necessary.224 This review should look at negative effects on human health and 
the environment and include an up-to-date survey of all recorded claims 
against the substance from both the National Vaccine Injury Compensation 
Program (“NVICP”) and the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System 
(“VAERS”).225 
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Once the scientific literature review is completed, the agencies can begin 
the research phase of the project where agencies working together will maxim-
ize resources.226 A combination of the collective research by the public health 
agencies and EPA, as well as outside scholarship from universities and indus-
tries to ensure that the research is reliable, will be critical to the public’s trust 
of the project’s final standards.227 With the availability of accurate and easily 
accessible data, any controversy in the future can be resolved quickly and deci-
sively based on scientific evidence rather than fear.228 
Finally, and most critically, the regulatory process must be ongoing and 
responsive to future developments in order to be effective, preventive, and 
predictive of future controversies because, when new research like the Wake-
field study appears, it can be scrutinized and considered against the body of 
evidence compiled.229 Based on scientific principles, the project would clearly 
identify the relevant factors to be used when the agencies decide between 
maintaining the current standard and making a quick change.230 
B. Benefits of a Comprehensive Ethylmercury Review 
Agencies must keep in mind is that the first impression is often all that 
matters.231 As exemplified by the fish consumption recommendation, the first 
action taken by the agency must be thoughtful, balance caution and risk care-
fully, and make a timely recommendation.232 When any of these elements is 
out of balance, the public loses trust in the final recommendation.233 Thus, 
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when the revised recommendation is made, it must be done with an abundance 
of support and transparency.234 By being able to point to a compilation of re-
search data from a variety of sources in making a revised recommendation, the 
public will be more likely to trust the change.235 
A thorough procedure for determining safety levels of ethylmercury offers 
benefits far beyond just the immediate concern of determining the safe levels 
for vaccinations.236 First, it will allow agencies to work together to create an 
efficient, cost-effective set of standards to apply in rapidly developing situa-
tions, similar to the ASD controversy, while spreading the burden between the 
public and private sectors.237 Most importantly, it will build consumer confi-
dence in current and future regulation and recommendations made by the 
agencies, resulting in an increased likelihood of success for their regulatory 
goals.238 
Although the process outlined may appear to be a mammoth project, the 
burden can be spread across the agencies in a way that will utilize each agen-
cy’s expertise and industry specific knowledge.239 Through the review process, 
the agencies will become better educated on ethylmercury and the data sup-
porting its safety, creating an efficient and robust source of knowledge for fu-
ture decisions.240 Comprehensive ethylmercury data and standards will allow 
the agencies to make rapid determinations and streamline decision-making, 
particularly for the FDA, as its leadership will create efficiency.241 
More clearly defined safety standards will give the agencies a trustworthy 
and easily available resource when urgent questions arise.242 The project would 
give agencies a clear understanding of both ethylmercury and methylmercury, 
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their differences, and which, if any, standards are comparable and interchange-
able.243 Under this scheme, if the Wakefield study were released today, it could 
be quickly compared to the breadth of recently verified data on ethylmercury 
and its acceptable standards.244 There would be, therefore, no question to the 
public health agencies in a Wakefield-like scenario that the methylmercury 
standards were not analogous to ethylmercury standards.245 
What the vaccine controversy underlines most is that although govern-
ment agencies may be comfortable with classifying a substance as safe without 
comprehensive study, the American public is not.246 Lack of public trust can 
rapidly derail the goals of regulation, just as the ASD controversy undermined 
the broad public health aims of herd immunity.247 
CONCLUSION 
When viewed within the scheme of the United States’ regulatory history 
with mercurial substances, the vaccine controversy was neither unpredictable 
nor out of the ordinary. It was, however, preventable. Thus, the agencies must 
view the event as a cautionary tale and, while healing the wounds it caused, 
work to prevent them from repeating in the future. 
The agencies’ decision to trust a single study and borrow EPA’s methyl-
mercury standards in banning thimerosal from vaccines was dangerous and 
went against both scientific methodology and legal causation requirements. 
Their later reversal was similarly shortsighted and risky in the face of the 
growing public health threat of noncompliance with vaccinations. Thus, the 
government must first resolve the controversy by definitively proving the safe-
ty of ethylmercury. 
The FDA must take the lead, in coordination with the other public health 
agencies and EPA, to create a comprehensive body of research sufficient to 
determine what level of exposure to ethylmercury is safe. The agencies must 
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also work with the private sector to continue scientific scholarship on ethyl-
mercury to increase public trust of the results. The unique history of mercury 
regulation requires a heavier burden, but the effort will reap benefits for future 
public health events. 
  
 
